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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE "BURDEN
THEORY" APPLIED TO AIR
TRANSPORTATION
GEORGE B. LOGAN*
Ladies and Gentlemen: I regret that the subject assigned to
me is impossible of treatment without in a considerable measure
encroaching upon the scope of the very splendid paper just delivered
by Mr. Kintz, and is in some respect a duplication of it. I dis-
avow any intention or ability of covering the some topics covered
by Mr. Kintz with even approximate skill, but it is necessary in
the discussion of my topic to cover some of the same ground.
As I view the regulation of flying, it involves two considera-
tions, first, the regulation of the act of flying, and second, the regula-
tion of the business of aerial transportation. As we understand our
theory of the Federal Constitution, it is quite obvious that such
things as places of flying, the height of flying, stunt flying, and the
regulations thereof are based primarily on the hope, at least, of
making flying safe for the fliers, their passengers and the public,
and consequently such regulation is based upon the police power,
and under our constitution the police power is vested solely in
the states.
That may sound like treason to the aviation interests, who,
despairing of uniform state regulation, recognizing the advisability
of uniformity, have prayed for and consistently prayed for federal
regulation. At the risk of appearing treasonable, I wish to start
out with the statement that the regulation of the act of flying is
primarily a state matter. The regulation of the business of flying,
in so far as that business is not interstate commerce is also a matter
of state regulation. The regulation of the business of flying in
so far as it is interstate is, of course, as you know, purely a matter
vested in the federal Congress by the federal Constitution.
It would seem simple to state, under those rules, that an air
carrier operating between St. Louis and Kansas City is not sub-
ject to congressional action, and that an air carrier operating be-
tween Chicago and St. Louis is not subject to regulation either
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by Illinois or Missouri. But unfortunately one cannot so simply
state the rules governing the combining, the shadow ground, the
interlocking of federal, or rather, of interstate and intrastate com-
merce.
I would like to have you all believe that this paper comes en-
tirely out of my head, and that I did not even look at a book for it,
but I am not going to try to put that over. I am very much in-
debted to a splendid paper delivered last fall by Mr. Kenneth
Burgess, General Counsel for the Burlington Railroad, and I am
also indebted to a study of this subject by Mr. Abraham Fishman,
appearing in the Journal of Air Law, for the formulation of the
principles I wish to announce.
Intrastate commerce is for the regulation of states alone, and
the federal government may not enter that field except (and the
exception is of primary importance), where necessary to prevent
interference with, or discrimination against, or interruption of, or
burden upon, interstate commerce; or except where it is necessary,
in the effective regulation of interstate commerce, to incidentally
regulate intrastate commerce.
With respect to interstate commerce, there are two classes, if
you please, of regulation. There is the. broad national field of
interstate commerce, where the states may not enter, and may never
enter, even though congress may not have entered the field of
particular regulation, because, it being a matter of national con-
cern only, the courts have held that the very silence of congress
is evidence of the fact that they want no regulation. But there is
a portion of interstate commerce where the states may enter, and
that is where there is a matter of local concern incidentally affect-
ing interstate commerce, where the states may enter until Congress
enters, providing always that such regulations of interstate com-
merce in such local matters do not constitute a burden on interstate
commerce.
Hence you will see that the burden theory applies in two ways;
first, to divest the states of their constitutional police power, and
to permit the federal government to enter the field of intrastate
commerce, and second, to act as a bar to the entrance of states
into the field of interstate commerce, and to draw the line as to
how far they may go in that field, namely, that they must stop
when Congress enters, and must also stop when they have reached
the point of creating a burden on interstate commerce.
Perhaps the best statement of the burden theory, as illustrated
by the principles I have announced, is found in Robert's book on
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"Interstate Commerce," which is: "Whenever there exists such
an interblending and interdependence between interstate commerce
and intrastate commerce that the freedom, well-being or safety of
the former depends upon the latter, Congress, or an administrative
body delegated with national authority may regulate intrastate com-
merce in so far as it is necessary to preserve the freedom, the well-
being and the safety of the commerce exclusively within the federal
control."
Please note the use of the words "in so far as is necessary,"
because that calls for a determination of fact in every case to de-
termine whether or not the federal interposition of authority is
necessary to regulate, and preserve the well-being of interstate
commerce.
The burdens which have been described by the federal courts,
or rather, the things which have been described by the federal
courts as constitutinq burdens on interstate commerce may be
readily classified into three classes. First, there is the physical
burden, and under that heading we have had the decisions with
reference to the safety appliance acts, particularly the decision of
Southern Railway v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20, where it was held that the
federal act specifying the use of safety appliances on cars engaged
in interstate commerce must necessarily also apply to the same and
similar cars used in intrastate commerce, the safety of interstate
commerce being dependent upon the use of the same safety ap-
pliances throughout the system of transportation.
Second, there have been the financial burdens, and under that
we have the famous Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, and the
Shreveport case, 234 U. S. 342, where it was held that federal
power may intervene to prevent the establishment of intrastate
rates, both freight and passenger, where the imposition of those
rates on intrastate commerce would result in a financial burden to
interstate commerce.
Third, we have the administrative burden, and under that head-
ing we have the recent case of the Atlantic-Pacific Stages v. Stahl,
36 Fed. (2d) 260, where it was held a state may not require of an
interstate carrier a certificate of convenience and necessity. In
other words, the state was deprived of the right of determining
the question as to whether or not this particular carrier should
enter business within the state. We also have the case of the
Western Union v. Boegli, 251 U. S. 315, where statutes penalizing
the telegraph company for delay in delivering messages were held
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to be unconstitutional, as imposing a burden on intefstate commerce
in that administrative way.
The latest decision we have is the decision in the case of the
Colorado Public Utilities Commission, involving aviation, and that
is found in the Public Utilities Report of 1928-E, Page 518. That
is purely and simply a recognition by the Colorado Public Utilities
Commission of the principles heretofore announced. An interstate
carrier by air applied to the Commis~ion for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity to operate an air line from Denver to
Kansas City. The court granted the certificate without an examina-
tion into the question as to whether public necessity or convenience
required it or justified it, holding that, this being interstate com-
merce, the state law applicable to certificates of public convenience
and necessarily did not, and could not, apply, and they were there-
fore required to issue the permit without further ado.
There has just come in the mail this morning the bare synopsis
of a decision by the U. S. District Court of the Western District
of Oklahoma in the case of U. S. Airways v. Shaw, State Auditor,
holding that a gasoline tax on gasoline used by an air carrier en-
gaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce, where the com-
merce was so intermingled that it was impossible to sep-
arate the usage of the gasoline, constituted a burden upon
interstate commerce, and the tax was held to be void. That
was a decision dated August 13 of this year. The question is
whether or not the principles of regulation which I have announced
do apply in their full import to the act of flying and the business
of aerial transportation, and do apply in general to air business as
they have applied heretofore to railroads and to water carriers.
The Air Commerce Act, referred to by Mr. Kintz, was not
passed primarily as a regulation of interstate commerce, or indeed
a regulation of commerce of any kind. The title of the Act is,
"An Act to encourage the use of aircraft in commerce, and for
other purposes." In a definition of the word "commerce" the word
"interstate" is not used, nor the words "between the states," nor
"between states and foreign countries."
The Secretary of Commerce, under Section 2, has put upon
him the duty of fostering air commerce, with no specification as to
whether it shall be interstate or intrastate. In granting the regula-
tory powers to the Secretary of Commerce he is given the authority
to provide for registration, rating, licensing and so forth of air-.
men, aircraft, airports, and there is no restriction in the granting
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of these regulatory powers as to interstate or intrastate commerce.
It might well be questioned as to whether there was any in-
tention on the part of Congress to limit the regulatory scope of this
act to interstate or intrastate commerce. In fact, it is very clear,
both from what Mr. Kintz has told us, from what Mr. MacCracken
told us yesterday and from the debates in Congress, that this act
is a compromise, that it was originally intended to apply to all air
commerce. Thus, we find a segregation made between interstate
and intrastate commerce, which is Section 11, where there are
penalties provided for violation of air traffic rules by all fliers, and
there is no penalty provided for failure to register, failure to have
an airman's certificate, or failure to do any of the other acts pro-
vided for by the law unless you are engaged in interstate commerce.
Now, first, is the Air Commerce Act valid? Second, is the
application of Air Traffic Rules to all flying a valid exercise of con-
gressional authority? In the case of Smith v. New England Air-
craft Company, the act was first considered by any court in this
country, and it was there held to be valid, although the constitutional
attack was not on the ground that it was not a proper act under the
interstate commerce clause, but the constitutional attack there was
on the ground that if a right of flight was created by the act it was
taking private property without due process of law and without
due compensation; but in any event, to that extent the act as a whole
was held valid.
In the case of Swetland v. Curtiss Airport et al the Air Traffic
Rules were held valid as to interstate commerce, but, as pointed
out by Mr. Kintz, the court dwelt on the fact that the State of
Ohio, by legislating in such a manner as to evidence an intention
that the Air Traffic Rules and the Air Commerce Act, insofar as
intrastate commerce was concerned, were to be recognized as valid
by the state of Ohio, also held that the Air Traffic Rules applied to
intrastate commerce. One is left with a little suspicion of doubt
as to whether or not the court would have held that the Air Traffic
Rules applied to intrastate commerce in that state had it not been
for the evident intention of the state of Ohio that they should so
apply.
In Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the court held
that the Air Traffic Rules would apply to intrastate commerce if
necessary. So, again, we come back to that same expression, "in-
sofar as is necessary." Therefore, to determine whether or not
the application of the Air Traffic Rules to all flying is valid, we
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must determine the question of the necessity for the Air Traffic
Rules as a measure of prevention of burden to interstate com-
merce. In fact the court, in the Neiswonger case, gave this ex-
pression: "It is not clear how intrastate flying at a height of less
than five hundred feet will interfere with interstate flying at five
hundred feet and above," raising a doubt, if you please, as to
whether or not that particular Air Traffic Rule, namely, the mini-
mum height regulation, was necessary to prevent a burden on inter-
state commerce.
Suppose Congress should at some time decide that because of
the numerous grade crossing accidents we have had, that because
of the large burden resulting to railroads by reason thereof, and
because of the fact, which is perfectly obvious to any of you, that
ninety-five per cent of all grade crossing collisions between railroad
trains and automobiles are due to the failure of the drivers of the
automobiles to exercise ordinary care, and that in ninety-five per
cent of the cases the occupants recover nevertheless, suppose Con-
gress should hold that to prevent that burden to interstate commerce
they would pass a law requiring the operator of every automobile,
whether engaged in intrastate commerce or any commerce at all,
to stop at every railroad crossing, would that be a valid exercise
of the right of Congress to prevent an undue burden to interstate
commerce?
Suppose we go further and Congress should say that because
of the increasing amount of interstate commerce carried by busses,
both passenger and freight, and because of the crossing accidents
and the collisions resulting in injuries to interstate passengers and
resulting in damage to interstate freight, "we will now pass a law
regulating all driving of pleasure automobiles, or automobiles en-
gaged in intrastate commerce." Would that be a valid exercise of
the power of Congress to prevent an undue burden on interstate
commerce?
Are not those two questions rather analogous to the question
that in order to prevent air accidents, collisions in the air, and so
forth, Congress shall now specify rules regulating flying, pleasure
or intrastate commerce?
I do not believe the answers to the first two questions determine
the answer to the third. I am not prepared to say that the first two
questions may not be answered in the affirmative; namely, that
they would be a valid exercise of the authority of Congress to
prevent an undue burden on interstate commerce. The time may
come when that will be so held. I rather think that they will be
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so held, particularly in the first case. In any event, the final de-
termination of whether or not a particular law or regulation is
necessary is up to the federal courts, and not to any jury or to any
state court, and the federal court being dominant we might anticipate
an affirmative answer to both of the first questions.
But the analogy between those two questions and the air
question is not complete. In other words, your collision with A
train may cause some damage. It is not likely to kill anybody on
the train. It is not likely to destroy the cargo carried in interstate
commerce on the train. But a collision in the air is almost bound
both to be fatal to the interstate passengers and destructive of the
interstate cargo carried. So, irrespective of how we answer the
first two questions, I believe the answer to the third is that the
imposition of Air Traffic Rules to apply on all flying is the valid
exercise of the power of Congress to prevent a burden on interstate
commerce.
Does that mean that all Air Traffic Rules are valid? I can
well understand how the rule (and the rules cover a wide scope,
as all fliers know), for instance, preventing stunt flying over a civil
airway is absolutely essential to the preservation of interstate com-
merce. I cannot quite understand how the rule preventing stunt
flying over a football game, which is one of the same Air Traffic
Rules, is necessary to prevent an undue burden to interstate com-
merce. There are several other rules that have a similar lack of
apparent application, but I believe that the federal courts, in con-
sidering the question which I have put, would look to the reason-
ableness of the scheme as a whole-do the Air Traffic Rules as a
whole appear to be necessary to prevent an undue burden upon
interstate commerce? If so, if they are part of a scheme necessary
for the effective control of interstate commerce, I believe the single
ones would neither be held to be singled out and held unreasonable,
nor would the scheme as a whole be held to be invalid because
one or two rules might not properly apply.
So far I have discussed the act of flying. We come now to
the business of flying. The Air Traffic Rules are made applicable
to flying, but there is no universal application as to intrastate com-
merce of the requirements of being a licensed pilot or the safety
and airworthiness of aeroplanes, and of similar requirements in
the manufacture of planes. For instance, there is no penalty for
operating any kind of a ship by any kind of a pilot in intrastate
commerce or in no commerce at all so far as the federal law is
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
concerned. Incidentally, that is one of the present failures of the
Air Commerce Act, as I view it, and has given rise to this apparent
and overwhelming demand for state regulation concerning the stated
topic. In other words, Congress has not entered this field, but if
Congress did enter this field and provide that it was unlawful for
an unlicensed airman, a man not having a federal license, to fly
anywhere any time, would it be valid? Suppose they should pro-
vide that it was unlawful for a plane that is not airworthy to fly
anywhere any time. Would that be valid?
I believe that under the decisions, and more particularly under
the tendency of the decisions, such a law would be held valid, as
preventing an undue burden on interstate commerce. There are
two difficulties in the way at present. In the first place, Congress
has not entered this field, and in the second place the personnel
of the Department of Commerce, Aeronautics Division, high in
quality, is extremely low in quantity. There are not enough inspec-
tors to go around to adequately enforce the Air Traffic Rules and
the registration requirements and the airport rules that are now in
effect. I am told there are three in the state of Illinois. I do not
know how many are needed, but it would appear that they would
need many more than that in the City of Chicago or Cook County
alone. Therefore the field of normal police power, in so far as the
business of flying is concerned, is still wide open. It is still per-
fectly competent for every state to require a license, federal if
you please, or state if you please, of pilots, and proper qualifica-
tions, and to require a certificate of airworthiness of planes.
It is possible too, and doubtless effective, to have similar state
laws concerning the act of flying, but obviously if the state laws
concerning the act of flying, or state regulations concerning the
act of flying, attempted to permit a violation of the federal regula-
tions of the act of flying, they would be to that extent invalid.
It would seem to me that the enactment of state laws requiring
a license for the pilot and a qualification for the plane would not
only be valid at the present time but desirable; further, state laws
imposing the same flying rules as federal laws would not only be
proper, but desirable. They cannot conflict, but they would be
desirable from the standpoint of adding an additional police per-
sonnel to the enforcement officials now in existence. It appears
to me, further, that such legislation by the states as I now propose
should never be in detail, because the art of flying, the engineering
advancements of flying, may speedily solve some of the problems
that we are now facing; and the law should neither hinder the
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advance of the art of flying nor the business of flying, nor attempt
to anticipate the future, because anyone who sets himself up as a
prophet and says thus and so cannot be done is just as foolish
as he can possibly be. I have long since gotten over saying it can't
be done. I saw a little play the other day. The scene was laid
in New York in 1820, and the young hero of the play had an am-
bition to become an inventor. The father of the heroine discour-
aged him from hoping to become an inventer. He said, "It might
have been all right fifty years ago, but think of becoming an in-
ventor now, when everything has been invented. That is perfectly
absurd." I think an attempt to cover the future of aviation by
legislative enactment is also the height of absurdity.
The business of flying within the state, it seems to me, needs
corrective measures aside from those things I have already men-
tioned. The state should require a proper permit by a corporation
engaged in carrying passengers with the state. The federal gov-
ernment has not entered that field. That requirement should in-
clude not only a qualification as to competency of the official per-
sonnel of the company, but solvency in one way or another, either
by its actual invested capital or by some form of insurance or other-
wise to protect the traveling public within the state. It might also
be possible to have effective regulation for permits to operate an
airport. The federal government now has ratings of the airports,
and now has airport regulations, and a good many airports are
unable to get proper ratings, but it does not prevent them from
opening and operating, and it seems that might be a proper field
for state regulation or entrance, if you please.
Of course, there can never be any state regulation affecting
interstate commerce, by way of requiring a permit or a license, by
way of requiring a publication of a schedule of rates, by way of
fixing rates, by way of requiring an amount of capital or by way
of limiting the profit to be made on the invested capital of air
carriers engaged in interstate commerce. That is a field which has not
been entered by the federal government but cannot be entered by the
state government. The federal government has never entered the
field of attempting to regulate interstate bus lines or interstate
trucking lines, has never attempted to fix profits, require capital
or financial strength of companies engaged in that form of inter-
state commerce, but the states cannot enter that field, and there are
a good many decisions to that effect, so that is something beyond
the power of the states, because it comes under the last principle
of interstate commerce, namely, it is a matter of national concern,
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and even though the state might require a license fee of only $10
to permit a man to engage in interstate commerce within the bound-
aries of the state, that requirement is invalid.
In conclusion, it would appear that the state police power may
be exercised fully with respect to the act of flying and with respect
to the business of flying within the state borders, but whenever
the state laws pertaining to the act of flying conflict with federal
laws or regulations pertaining thereto, they will be held invalid,
because the federal laws or regulations are necessary to effectively
regulate interstate commerce and to prevent a burden thereon.
State laws with respect to the business of aerial transportation
within their borders will be held valid unless they affect the busi-
ness of an interstate carrier to such a degree as to burden inter-
state commerce. State laws which incidentally affect interstate com-
merce, such as requiring certain conveniences for passengers or on
planes will be held valid unless they constitute a burden on inter-
state commerce, because that is a field which Congress has not yet
entered, although it is interstate commerce, and the states may enter
until they do, providing it is not burdensome.
In further conclusion, I wish to join in the prayer that has been
constantly put up by the aviation interests, the prayer for uniformity
of regulation and of laws. It is an open question as to whether
aviation would be more seriously hurt by the black eyes given to
our oft-proclaimed theory of safety by the unreliable, unregulated,
unqualified and illegal flying, resulting in crashes, or whether it
would be more hurt by an attempt to stop this unregulated, un-
qualified and illegal flying by unwise and conflicting state legisla-
tion. If the state legislation pertaining to prevent this type of air
hazard may be intelligently passed and intelligently enforced, and
may be broadly enacted rather than in detail, it offers great hope
of assistance to the development of the cause of aviation. We want
aviation to grow, and to grow it must grow safely and also in an
untrammeled manner, and the shadow ground between the too little
and too much regulation calls for careful, loving care and judgment.
(Applause.)
CHAIRMAN HADLEY: I am sure we are all very much indebted to Mr.
Logan for this wonderful, able discussion on this most interesting question,
and before we take up the general discussion of the questions of these two
lectures this morning I wish to say to Mr. Kintz and to Mr. Logan that I
am sure every person here appreciates your efforts and is grateful for the
able and masterful manner in which you have presented this subject before
the convention.
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Now we would be very happy to have discussion from the floor on these
questions that have been presented this morning.
MR. T. H. KENNEDY (California): There are a few points raised by
Mr. Logan that I should like to ask further explanation on. In the first
place, I might say that in part, and almost in whole, I agree with Mr.
Logan's contentions. It seems to me that his position is one of what might
be termed a strict constructionist. He has gone into the subject of the
division of state and federal powers in an analytical fashion which I think
is most helpful and necessary.
It occurs to me that in times past we have been a little bit too prone to
use what has been termed as the inverted premise method of reasoning. We
have found that we think we need uniformity of regulation and legisla-
tion, and therefore we have set about to use all manner of means and argu-
ment at our command to see if we can not get some basis for substantiating
that claim or that need.
We have felt that federal legislation is absolutely essential, and there-
fore we must use all arguments to support the absolute domination of fed-
eral authority, and we have been a little bit too inclined to slough over the
real legal reasoning behind the division of state and federal authority. How-
ever, Mr. Logan's analysis is most helpful, and I think we can not be too
great in our praise of his work.
He makes certain statements, though, that I should like to ask him
about. I believe at one point in his talk he made the statement that if a
state permitted a violation of the federal regulation, such permit would be
invalid. I think he referred to the Air Traffic Rules, and to use the example
that he brought forward himself, that of regulation of flying over a foot-
ball game.
Do I understand Mr. Logan to say that if the state permitted stunting
over the football game, which would be in violation of the federal act and
the federal regulations, such a state permit would be invalid, where there is
no question whatever of an interstate air lane in the vicinity of the football
stadium? That is one question I would like to hear discussed.
Then Mr. Logan also raised the point of the interacting area of state
and federal regulation. A state can not enter certain phases of regulation
of interstate commerce even though the federal government has not acted.
That is certainly a very pregnant subject and one we must examine with
the utmost care, because we can all see that this law that we are attacking
here is absolutely new and unexplored; we have very few decisions, and we
must work by analogy all the way through. To date we have a great field
of interstate regulation that has not been occupied by the federal govern-
ment. Is the state absolutely forclosed as to action on those points?
Mr. Logan has listed first, second, third and fourth certain subjects that
the state' can not act upon, even though the federal government has not acted.
May we not examine those points a little more closely?
Another question, and it is a general question, are we justified in work-
ing by analogy? We have bus cases, we have railroad cases, we have mari-
time cases. Are they good law? Are they good law for air cases? That
is the question we must always be confronted with from now until dooms-
day. Our precedents in other forms of all kinds of law business, are they
good? Are the actual mechanical differences between the aeroplane, the
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glider and the dirigible so great we can not use the analogy of the bus, the
railroad and the steamship?
That is a subject, gentlemen, that we must give most careful attention
to. There are certain things we know about aircraft that we know are
not the same. They have certain attributes not to be found in any other
mode of transportation. The speed of the thing, for instance; the mobility,
the unity with which it operates, the fact that it has a three-dimensional
method of operation, it is not confined to the surface-are those things, those
characteristics, so different than other forms of transportation, other units
used in transport service, that the law that has grown up around the other
transportation mediums will be found inadequate of application and will it
be impossible for us to use the precedents that our books are found to be
filled with?
Those questions I think we must study very carefully, and I should like
very much to hear from Mr. Logan a little more in detail on those points.
MR. LOGAN: I shall try to answer you, Mr. Kennedy. I want to state
first that I have been talking up here for two weeks, and quite a number of
the audience today ig the same audience I have been talking to, so I have
perhaps not repeated some things out of deference to them that I might well
have explained in my talk.
First, with respect to the analogy. I quite agree with you that we
can not accept analogies whole-heartedly, as a fish accepts bait, because
they will not always apply, and I think I pointed out this morning that the
analogy between the automobile and the railroad and between the auto-
mobile and air commerce was not necessarily an analogy to be followed.
We can not accept analogies without a very careful study.
Now with respect to the field in which the state is foreclosed in its
acts, I think we need not argue much about that, because the courts have
laid down that definition, and that is, where the subject of interstate com-
merce is one of national concern, the states may not enter, and there are
dozens of decisions along that line. I think, in addition to the case I cited,
there is the case of Bush v. Malloy, and Duke v. the Commissioners, of
Michigan, and several other cases prohibiting the states from making any
legislation affecting interstate commerce which is of national concern.
With respect to the state law about stunting over a football field, let us
assume that the federal regulation, and I think it does, prohibits stunt flying
over a congregation of persons, and prohibits any flying at less than 2,000
feet over such congregations. Let us assume the state law permits the stunt-
ing and flying at 1,000 feet. I do not say that the state law is necessarily
invalid, but it would certainly be ineffective to prevent a prosecution under
the federal law for the violation of the same thing, because where the two
laws exist covering the same subject, the federal law is bound to be the
dominant one, providing the federal law under the circumstances which we
have mentioned is necessary to prevent a burden on interstate commerce.
I think I pointed out to you that I do not see the clear necessity, but I
do not believe the question of necessity will be determined by the one rule
alone. It will probably be determined by the whole scope of the Air Traffic
Rules and their necessity as a system, as a scheme, to prevent a burden on
interstate commerce.
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CHAIRMAN HADLEY: Are there any other questions? Is there any
further discussion?
MR. JOHN M. VORYS (Ohio): I came here expecting to see a fight
some place along the line, but these papers today, the wonderful paper Mr.
Kintz read and the perfectly brilliant discussion of Mr. Logan, have either
accorded with my views or jersuaded me out of my views, so I do not see
much chance for argument, and the silence here apparently gives unanimous
consent to the views of these gentlemen.
There was one point not discussed, and which may be outside of the
scope of the papers, but which I should like to raise and secure the opinion
of these gentlemen upon. It has been pointed out that while the Traffic
Rules, the licensing system, should be laid down by the federal govern-
ment, that as a practical matter, and for some time to come, probably for
all time to come, the federal enforcement authorities will be insufficient,
and as flying increases our ordinary local officials will have to take care
of the enforcement of certain of the Air Traffic Rules.
Now I wonder whether these gentlemen think that it would be sufficient
to incorporate by reference the Air Traffic Rules into a state law, and then
into a city ordinance, which would be very helpful in the matter of enforce-
ment; that is, to prevent improper flying over a city, or Would it be neces-
sary in the one case to enact a statute or promulgate a state regulation, and
in the other to enact a city ordinance?
I have heard a number of discussions on this, the one view being that
whereas the state can require a certain standard which can be complied
with only by getting a license from another authority, that is, from the
federal government, because the license is something definite and the stand-
ards behind it are those which may be obtained and found out before you
secure the license, yet on the other hand the state can not require com-
pliance with a set of flying regulations which theoretically are written down
some place in Washington and are not available within the state.
It would be a matter of great convenience and would simplify the
problem for the states very much if, as a physical matter, they could simply
pass a little short law requiring compliance with the federal Air Traffic
Rules, and encourage each city to pass that sort of an ordinance, which many
cities have done in Ohio, and then send out a lot of pamphlets of the Air
Traffic Rules that we would get from Washington and expect everybody
to comply with them.
I wonder what Mr. Kintz and Mr. Logan would think is the constitu-
tional problem as to incorporating by reference the Air Traffic Rules for
local enforcement.
CHAIRMAN HADLEY: Mr. Kintz will reply to that.
MR. KINTZ: Mr. Vorys, we have recommended a new suggested draft
of state legislation which incorporates a paragraph or a section incorporat-
ing in the state law the Air Traffic Rules by reference. I think that is
legal unless it is specifically prohibited by the state constitution, and there
are some cases that bear that out.
On the other hand, if the state constitution specifically prohibits the
enactment of any law or regulation by reference, then the authority created
by the state law to enforce the state rules or regulations could be given
the specific authority, with a specific prohibition against enacting any other
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regulations than the federal regulations. In other words, you, as Director
of Aeronautics, could be authorized and charged with the duty of enacting air
traffic rules identical with those of the federal department, and could be further
charged with the duty of keeping those air traffic rules current with the
changes of the department, being specifically limited from enacting any other
regulations or rules than those promulgated by the department.
It is in two forms. We have suggested that they enact the Air Traffic
Rules by reference. In those states which specifically prohibit by the con-
stitution enactment by reference we have suggested that a person in the
state be appointed to enact air traffic rules by regulation identical with the
Air Traffic Rules of the department.
MR. VoRYs: What I wondered particularly about was what your opinion
was of the matter of delegation of that portion of the police power.
MR. KiNTZ: We are in favor of state enforcement.
MR. VoRYs: Can you make a city ordinance to provide that violations
of a federal Air Traffic Rule, promulgated by an administrative body under
the federal government, shall be punishable by a fine?
MR. KINTZ: I would incorporate the Air Traffic Rules by reference,
stating that they are hereby incorporated as though written in, and then
your violation would be for the violation of the state law, rather than viola-
tion of the federal Air Traffic Rules, because you have incorporated them
by reference, therefore they are a part of your state rules.
MR. LoGAN: That question was discussed and has been discussed quite
frequently in the American Bar Association and its committee and there
are two classes of decisions holding that incorporating a set of regulations
in a state law is unconstitutional, the first class holding that incorporating
any other state laws or regulations or federal laws or regulations is invalid,
and the second class of decisions holding that it may be valid as to those
regulations then in existence, but will be invalid as to any regulations sub-
sequently passed, because you can readily see that is a delegation of the
criminal authority of the state to another body, creating a crime by the
violation of a regulation or rule which is not yet in existence.
There are also cases that hold that unless the constitution of the state
forbids it, the incorporation of the regulations by reference is valid.
It would seem that the safest way is to require the regulating authority
of the state to promulgate regulations which must be in conformity with the
federal regulations. You do not then have to set out the regulations in the
act, but the official will have to set out the regulations by some form of
proclamation; requiring him to keep them always uniform accomplishes the
same purpose and does not run the risk of the unconstitutionality of incor-
porating by reference.
MR. VoRYs: Let me ask one question as to the physical way of doing
that.
Would it be possible for a state official, under such a law, to pro-
mulgate a set of regulations, which would be identical with the federal regu-
lations, and then, in order to save printing and in order to save himself
and such officials in every state from the temptation to monkey a little bit
with those regulations, if he would get a cart load of the Air Traffic Rules
from Washington and send those out and say "This is an exact copy of what
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I have promulgated in my office," would that be sound constitutionally? It
would certainly be a convenient and safe way to do the thing.
MR. LOGAN: It sounds to me like a Scotch method, but I think it
would work.
Ma. KINTZ: In fact, I think one state actually did that.
LIEUT. HowARD KNOTTS (Illinois): I should like to suggest that Mrs.
Willebrandt be asked to discuss this matter. She for a long time has been
a member of the Aeronautic Committee of the American Bar Association.
(Applause.)
MRS. MABEL WALKER WILLEBRANDT: I am one of the members of the
American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautics, and if I may be per-
mitted to confess it, Mr. Logan is our most illustrious member. I subscribe
to what Mr. Logan has said, and I think I could not add more to his state-
ment of the discussion in the differentiation of the laws that are here under
discussion at this time.
LIEUT. KNoTTs: I should like to ask Mr. Kintz one question. I have
heard coming from the Department of Commerce from time to time, and I
think I understood Mr. Kintz to say this morning and then he passed on, that
when an aircraft leaves the ground it loses its intrastate character, and some-
how, by getting into the third medium of transportation or conductivity for
the craft it becomes interstate.
Would you please explain that theory a little bit?
MR. KINTZ: That is on the theory of analogy of Mr. Kennedy and
Mr. Logan that we can not take too far, and with which I agree. Once a
plane leaves the ground and has passengers for hire in it, ostensibly it is a
short hop from the field, yet when that craft once leaves the ground the
passengers may decide they want to travel interstate, so once it leaves the
ground you can not tell whether it is going to engage in interstate commerce
or a pleasure flight, or intrastate commerce.
The second theory is that all air space is navigable, and that you have
no defined routes such as railroad tracks or rivers, but that once in the air,
you are in an air lane through which any interstate operator may fly. It is
analogous to the navigable streams, I think, because once on a navigable
stream you may interfere with interstate commerce, and in that con-
nection, in the Maryland Oyster Boat Fishing cases the court held that
while traversing a navigable stream all ships, whether engaged in com-
merce, pleasure, interstate or intrastate trips were subject to the same set
of rules, which were promulgated for the safety of all concerned, and even
though traversing that navigable stream for pleasure, you might tend to
interfere with interstate commerce.
Once again, when a plane leaves the air, it circles over the airport.
There are no defined routes, consequently, due to wind conditions or weather
conditions, and an interstate plane, that is, a plane engaged in interstate
commerce, has to come into that port, therefore, even a pleasure flight
wholly over the airport area might seriously impede or interfere with or
hinder the particular interstate operation involved. The interstate pilot
comes in. He does not know whether the plane is going on an interstate
trip, getting ready to land or make a flight over the field or a test hop,
consequently, once the ground is left you are in a medium of transporta-
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tion, as I say, having no defined lanes, therefore all should be subject to the
same regulations.
Does that answer your question?
LIEUT. KNo'rrs: The navigability theory does, but not the question
about changing your mind, because it might be changed while they are in
the plane on the ground.
MR. LOGAN: Mr. Kintz, do you not think that renders it necessary to
make a decision between the act of flying and the business of flying? The
mere fact that a plane is in the air does not render it interstate in so far
as the kind of business it is doing is concerned, and in determining the ques-
tion whether a state body may regulate it as to its business and its rates
and capital structure, but certainly it is interstate in so far as flying is con-
cerned, to require compliance with the federal air rules. That is why we
have to make a distinction between the act of flying and the business of
flying.
MR. KINTZ: Mr. Frederic P. Lee has prepared very interesting memo-
randa on the history of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, and his theory is
along that line, that once you leave the ground, leaving the super-incumbent
air space, getting into what has been defined as navigable air, space, you
then lose the intrastate character of flying, and possibly not the business of
flying, but certainly of the flying, and as I said before, there being no
defined routes, all must be subject to the same regulations, because the routes
are such that they may cross any time.
MR. LOGAN: Oyster boats on navigable waters are certainly subject to
such rules and regulations Congress might impose with reference to inter-
state commerce, but they are engaged in intrastate commerce so far as their
license to do business is concerned.
MRS. WILLEBRANiyr: There is probably no state where the intrastate
phases of flying are more acute and, I believe, no state that has, in view of
the complex problems, kept itself any more free from conflicting regulations
and yet done everything to promote safety in flying, as New York State.
I think the delegate from New York started to speak a few moments ago
and was not recognized.
MR. JOHN D. SULLIVAN (New York): My only comment was not to
make a suggestion, but on a point raised by Mvr. Vorys, simply to say in
the State of New York we were faced with the same problem, the question
of constitutionality, and we decided rather than have any doubt we would
enact into the general business law all the regulations. We recognize the
fact that the regulations in turn may have to be changed, but we also realize
perhaps they will not require a great deal of changing year by year, and in
no case will we be more than six months behind, and then only on a few
regulations, and as we do it we make no reference whatever to the fact
that the regulations come from the Department of Commerce. They are
simply regulations, and they appear in the general business law of the State
of New York.
If any interstate flyer in New York wants to know what rules govern
him, in theory he goes to the general business law of the State of New York,
but in fact he knows if he complies with the rules and regulations of the
Department of Commerce he will not be in trouble in the State of New York,
so they are not concerned with whether it is interstate or intrastate.
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MR. LOGAN: Does your legislature meet once a year?
MR. SULLIVAN: Yes.
MR. LOGAN: In some states it is every two years.
MR. SULLIVAN: That is why I made no suggestion to any other state.
MR. KINTZ: The Chairman and the other members of the Conference
have given me considerable credit for the paper I read. I want to disabuse
your mind; it was prepared by Col. Clarence M. Young, Assistant Secretary
of commerce for Aeronautics, and I had the honor to read the paper for
him.
MR. ALAN A. BIRD (Maine): Mr. Kennedy suggested, I think, condi-
tions covering certain states. In my state our conditions are different. We
have very few landing fields there, but we want to have a uniform law.
We are new in the game, and I should like to inquire what the names of
those states are, in order that we may get some information relative to
uniform legislation to our next legislature, which convenes every two years.
MR. KINTZ: We have a bulletin, Aeronautics Bulletin No. 18, which
sets forth several suggested drafts of state legislation, one prepared by the
Department and one prepared by the American Bar Association, and then
there is a compromise, I think, between the two.
Then there are several publications on airport rating regulations, and
suggested municipal, city and county ordinances, and if ]- may have the
gentleman's name I will be glad to see that he gets the whole set of pub-
lications.
MR. BIRD: Has the American Bar Association promulgated any sug-
gestions at all, or did they simply hold it over?
Ma. LOGAN: They have held it open. Unfortunately the uniform law
proposed by the Air Law Committee at Memphis was not approved by the
committee, and the committee had only one meeting this year and did not
approve of any uniform law, and has asked for more time.
The uniform law Mr. Kintz refers to is of two years ago, and also,
he has a uniform law proposed by the Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws, the Air Law Committee of Commissioners. I think that is the
compromise bill.
MR. BIRD: I should like to inquire, Mr. Logan, do you approve of the
suggestions made by the department, or is that a compromise, from your
idea?
MR. LOGAN: I had never heard Mr. Kintz's paper. I did not know what
was in it. I do not think we have any differences of opinion, so far as I
can see.
MRs. WILLEBRANDT: Strictly speaking, I wanted Mr. Logan's statement
that there is now no proposed uniform law proposed by the American Bar
Association, because a year ago the Aeronautical Committee's report was
not adopted, but was withdrawn by the conference, and this year the com-
mittee is making no report, so there is no other proposed uniform law that
has received any endorsement save only that one from the Commerce
Department.
CHAIRMAN HADLEY: We will have this matter discussed further this
afternoon.
